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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

9 March 1982

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Special Analysis

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CENTRAL AMERICA: Elec	toral Fraud in Gua	temala	
Preliminary reports a committed fraud to assure a Guevara a plurality in the Sunday. In Nicaragua, the criticism—have postponed a political parties. Guerric be the beginning of a major	presidential electior Sandinistasconcerne legislative debate on lla attacks yesterday	date General n that was held ed about domesti a law dealing w in El Salvador	on c ith
//Independent replay Guevara's opponents Centrist candidate Malathat the government-own pany delayed electoral and other towns to give a lead in the close rather than the close	donado publicly cl ned telephone and returns from depa e the <u>impression</u> t	g was rigged aimed yesterd telegraph conrtmental capi	lay n- tals
Rightwing candida accused the government ened public demonstrat		doval <u>has thr</u>	ceat- 25X
Terrorist actions disrupt the election, lion votersover 40 play Guatemalan standard	ercent of those re	estimated l gistered and,	mil-
Guevara's first-p his selection as Guater ernment-controlled leg		ent by the go	
Comment: //The very prompted by fears that thereby be eliminated tinued international is officials are privately tions probably will compare the company of	from the runoffe solation of the re y upset, and vario	ish third and nsures the cogime. Venezu us Western na	l on- uelan u-
Domestic violence intends to negotiate for and other concessions the government. Noneth	rather than seek a	ressional sea showdown wit	its ch
		conting	ıed
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intends to negotiate for and other concessions	or additional cong rather than seek a	ressional sea showdown wit	oly ats th ned ned

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supporters and the security forces remain a possibility. The guerrillas may step up their activities in an effort to discredit further the election.	25 X 1
Unless they come to some accommodation with Guevara, the Christian Democratswho backed Maldonadoare likely to become increasingly alienated from the regime. Some may associate themselves with the leftist exile group operating in Mexico City or even join the guerrillas.	25 X 1
Nicaraguan Debate Postponed	
The Sandinsta-controlled Council of Statethe country's legislative assemblyhas postponed debate on a draft law on political parties for two months because of "national security" considerations. The Council, citing a recent report from Honduran leftists about an imminent invasion by Nicaraguan exiles, expressed concern that a debate with opposition parties could turn into a diversionary maneuver by sectors opposed to the revolution.	25 X 1
Comment: The postponement of the debates reflects heightened Sandinista sensitivity to domestic critics, whom they view as directed from abroad and bent on toppling the regime. Although moderate opposition parties have charged that the law would institutionalize Sandinista control over their activities, they nevertheless planned to participate in the debates.	25 X 1
Nicaraguan Airfield Improvements	
Construction of a 640-meter runway extension at the Puerto Cabezas Airfield is almost complete, but there is no evidence of construction of the necessary support facilities for MIGs. A drainage problem that caused construction to be stopped for several months has been solved.	25X1
Comment: The entire runway2,490 meters long probably will be operational by the end of March. The runway is long enough for jet fighters and within ferry	
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range of Cuba. The airfield, however, lacks aircraft shelters, jet fuel storage facilities, and radarsitems that probably would precede deployment of MIGs.
Insurgent Attacks in El Salvador
Guerrillas yesterday attacked two departmental capitals as well as military posts elsewhere in El Salvador.
Comment: These actions, which have been expected for several days, may be the beginning of the major insurgent offensive scheduled for this month.

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FINLAND-USSR: Visit by Koivisto	
Finnish President Koivisto's arrival in Moscow today for a three-day visit offers Soviet leaders a chance to solicit his views on bilateral relations, Nordic security, and European arms control.	25 X 1
The sensitivity of Koivisto's predecessor, Urho Kekkonen, to Soviet security interests earned Moscow's trust. The Soviets have had limited dealings with Koivisto, however, and would have preferred other candidates in the recent presidential election.	25X1
Comment: The Soviets may suspect that Koivisto seeks closer ties with the West and will be interested in probing his responsiveness to their security concerns. One issue likely to surface in Moscow will be the negotiation of an early extension of the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Treaty before it expires in 1990. Koivisto and several other Finnish political leaders believe that the USSR may be amenable to such an initiative, because it would remove one potential area of Soviet concern and demonstrate that all of Finland's major political parties support the foreign policy line developed under Kekkonen.	25X1
In the past, the Soviets have hinted that the Finns may need their assistance to defend Finnish territory against overflights by NATO cruise missiles, and they may raise the possibility of expanded military cooperation in connection with renewing the Friendship Treaty. The Finns hope to avert such Soviet overtures by promoting initiatives that call for a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone.	25 X 1
A proposed Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone may provide some further stimulus to West European antinuclear sentiment. Koivisto's interest in this concept probably is based on Finnish fears that NATO weapons in Scandinavia could serve as a pretext for Soviet demands that could compromise Finland's neutrality. Soviet leaders also are likely to encourage the Finns to inten-	•
negotiations.	25 X 1
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WEST GERMANY: Impact of Municipal Election //Chancellor Schmidt probably will use the Scharty's poor showing in the municipal elections on	ocial Democratic Sunday in
Schleswig-Holstein to buttress his argument that vering a move to the left by the party.//	25X
//The Social Democrats received only statewide, about 6 percent less than their 1978. The state party organization has lo the most leftist Social Democratic section ingly has opposed Schmidt in recent years.	showing in ong been one of as and increas-
//Fringe partiesespecially the envi "Green" party, which received 5 percentd into traditional Social Democratic constit Christian Democratic Union, which governs Holstein, increased its support from 49.2	dug heavily cuencies. The Schleswig-
Comment: //The Social Democratic Par embarrassing for Schmidt. Its totals, alo low voter turnout, will be interpreted widing public disillusionment with the Bonn cothe other hand, Schmidt and other moderate will now be able to argue that the party is electoral support when it shifts leftward.	ong with the dely as indicat- coalition. On es, however, nvariably loses
//Schleswig-Holstein's Minister Presi probably is disappointed by the Christian marginal improvement. He hoped that a str coupled with gains in the state election n enhance his prospects for challenging Helm ership of the national Christian Democrati	Democrats' conger showing, ext year, would out Kohl's lead-

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SOMALIA: Siad's Visit	
President Siad will attempt to obtain more aid and closer bilateral cooperation during his coming visit to Washington.	25X′
//Mogadishu's economic and military problems have led to internal unrest, tribal feuding, and grumbling among military leaders. The chief external threat is posed by a 3,000-man, Ethiopian- and Libyan-backed insurgent movement that is attempting to overthrow Siad. The funds, weapons, and training received by the insurgents from Tripoli last yearworth an estimated \$10 million enabled them to intensify activity in Somalia, but they remain too small and tribally isolated to replace Siad on their own.//	25X ²
//The Somalis have been disappointed by the limited military aid received from the West since they granted military access rights to Washington in 1980. Their armed forces have fallen into disarray since the collapse of the invasion of Ethiopia in 1977-78, and military leaders have been repeatedly humiliated by their inability to respond to sporadic Ethiopian and guerrilla raids and air attacks.//	25X ⁻
//Somalia lacks the funds needed to buy arms, and potential donors are reluctant to rearm the regime so long as it retains irredentist designs on the territory of all its neighbors. After leaving the US, Siad will seek similar support in Canada, the UK, France, West Germany, Italy, and Egypt.//	25X′
Comment: //Increased tribal tension and military dissatisfaction are adding to Siad's political problems. He probably hopes that an infusion of Western aid will strengthen his standing and allow him to avoid economic reforms that would jeopardize his use of patronage.//	25X′
<pre>//He is banking unrealistically on outside aid, how- ever, and no aid program currently under consideration in the West would solve Somalia's problems.//</pre>	25X 25X

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USSR-US: Additional Grain Purchase	
//The USSR reentered the US market due to buy almost 2 million tons of grain for the end of May. Moscow relied on short-terinance all of these grain purchases, worth the deputy director of the Soviet grain-burstates that future grain purchases will be credit.//	delivery by erm notes to th \$250 million.
Comment: //Recent transactions raise Soviet purchases and commitments to buy 42 tons of the 45 million tons they probably by 30 June. Most of the remaining 2.3 millikely to come from the US, where prices a credit is available. The increasingly sev hard currency shortage has forced Moscow to use of credit for purchases of grain from elsewhere.//	2.7 million will import Llion tons is are low and vere Soviet to make more
LIBYA-AUSTRIA: Qadhafi's Visit	
//Libyan leader Qadhafi reportedly is day official visit to Austria beginning to visit has been anticipated for some time b poned to allow Austrian Chancellor Kreisky recover his health.//	omorrow. The out was post-
Comment: //Both leaders view the mee as an opportunity to further personal ambi Qadhafi probably will try to use the visit more political respectability in Western E likelihood that poor health will force Kre down in the near future may prompt him to involvement in the Middle East peace proce	itions. t to achieve Europe. The eisky to step renew his ess.// 25X1
	25X1

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WEST GERMANY: Wage Agreement	
//Three major regional branches of West metalworkers union, including about half of lion members, have reached agreement with the for a 4.2-percent wage increase. The settle mates guidelines recommended by the Schmidten	tits 3.7 mil- cheir employers Lement approxi-
Comment: //The contract, which will so ther national wage negotiations, will mean real income if prices continue to rise at 6 they have over the last year. The decline will restrain imports and help to improve to tiveness of West German exports, which are the main source of economic growth this year agreements could reverse the decline in bus and encourage new investment, while helping rate of inflation and strengthening the decrease of the argument of the Social Democrats to	n a decline in percent as in real wages the competi-likely to be ar. Such siness profits to slow the atsche mark.
<pre>vide a better guarantee for labor peace.//</pre>	

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS		
ISRAEL: The Political Landscape After	Begin	, 25 V 1
		25 X 1
Prime Minister Begin's early departure be tion" from a dinner last week for French Presidunderscores Begin's fragile health. In the even permanent incapacitation, Defense Minister Sharearly edge among the possible successors. Share competition, however, from some of Begin's old Begin's successor as the leader of Herut cannot majority coalition, the Labor Party would try	dent Mitterrand ent of his death or ron would have an ron could face stiff er proteges. If t reconstitute a	•
		25X^
Succession Candidates and Likud's Stabi	ili+v	
Sharon, 53, occupies the second modern inet post, and he has used it to involve cymaking on all major external issues. military experience and aggressive lead moreover, appeal to the hawkish Sepharonity of North African and Middle Easter Sephardics, the principal voter constituting Likud coalition, constitutes nearly	ost powerful cab- we himself in poli- His wide-ranging dership style, dic Jewish commu- rn origin. The tuency of the rul-	į.
electorate.	,	25 X ′
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If a leadership struggle between Sharon and his challengers jeopardized the stability of Likud, Foreign Minister Shamir, 67, or Economic Coordination Minister Meridor, 68, would be possible alternatives. Second Deputy Prime Minister and Housing Minister Levi would be another possibility because of his Sephardic background and popularity among Sephardic voters. In the event of a deadlock, Finance Minister Aridor, 47, and Ambassador to the US Arens, 56, would be leading dark	5X 5X
The desire to remain in power probably would be sufficient to hold the coalition of Likud and the religious parties together initially. No successor from within Likud, however, would be able in the short term to duplicate Begin's unique command of the fractious coalition. Any new leader would face serious internal problems that could lead to the collapse of the coalition, an early election, and ultimately a realignment of	5X
In addition, no successor would be likely in the near term to moderate significantly Begin's tough strategy toward the West Bank and other Arab-Israeli issues. Sharon would be inclined to take the kinds of swift, surprise moves characteristic of Begin. Shamir, Meridor, and Levi would favor less provocative tacks and increased efforts to strengthen Israel's flagging international image and support.	5X
Labor's Prospects	
The Labor Party would face a difficult task to gain a workable majority in the Knesset that did not depend on the Rakah Communist Party for its survival. Labor Party leader Peres would have to persuade several small, moderate or left-of-center groups as well as the hawkish National Religious Party and at least one of two other major religious parties to join his cabinet.	5X

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Even if Peres succeeded, such a coalition would be pulled in many conflicting directions and would be in constant danger of early collapse. Labor, nevertheless, would try to promote new progress on the peace negotiation front by pushing its plan for West Bank - Gaza Strip territorial partition negotiations with Jordan.	25X1
If a Likud-led government continued in office after Begin, Labor would be forced to make major changes to broaden its appeal among Sephardic Jews. Some party leaders already are considering making popular President Navon, a Sephardic Jew, party chairman. Navon's term expires in May 1983, well before the next election that must be held no later than November 1985.	25X1
A number of Labor Party leaders, including former Prime Minister Rabin, favor joining Likud in a national unity government. Such a development is not likely, however, except in the event of a crisis severely impinging on Israel's security. If a unity government did come into being, Labor would try to moderate Likud's hardline stance on peace negotiation issues.	25 X 1
Relations With the US	
Any new government would want to maintain close relations with the US. It would seek continued high levels of US economic and military assistance, expanded bilateral security cooperation, and US help in facilitating Israeli arms sales in the Third World and in restoring diplomatic ties with key black African states.	25 X 1
A Labor-led government probably would make a greater tactical effort to accommodate US positions on major negotiation issues in an attempt to improve bilateral relations, to restore closer ties with other key Western states, and to blunt the Arabs' political leverage. By offering to negotiate a West Bank - Gaza territorial compromise with Jordan, Labor leaders also would hope to enable Israel to open a dialogue with Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states.	* 25 X 1
Any new government would take a tough line on the Syrian and PLO presence in Lebanon, new conventional arms to Arab countries, and Arab nuclear programs. Labor, however, would raise the threshold on what constitutes a	-
major security threat to the nation.	25 X 1
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